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NOTE
Children Sentenced to Die in Prison: Why a
Lifetime Behind Bars is No Longer Justified
for Juvenile Offenders
Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021).
Logan Moore*

I. INTRODUCTION
Brett Jones turned fifteen years old the summer before he was set to
start high school.1 Twenty-three days later, he was arrested and charged
as an adult.2 Now, he will spend the rest of his life behind bars.3 In the
United States, a fifteen-year-old child cannot legally vote,4 drink alcohol,5
or – in most states – drive a car without adult supervision.6 That same

*B.S., Truman State University, 2019; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School
of Law, 2023; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2021–2022; Senior Note and
Comment Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2022-2023. I am extremely grateful to
Associate Dean Paul Litton for his insight, guidance, and support during the writing
of this Note. I would also like to thank the members of the Missouri Law Review for
their help in the editing process.
1
Shirley L. Smith, Mississippi man’s case could affect fate of hundreds of
juvenile lifers, MISS. CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Oct. 20, 2020),
https://www.mississippicir.org/news/mississippi-mans-case-could-affect-fate-ofhundreds-of-juvenile-lifers [https://perma.cc/88YB-FREK].
2
Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1312 (2021); Id. at 1338 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
3
Id. at 1312–13 (majority opinion).
4
See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
5
See 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1984); Alcohol Policy, NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE
&
ALCOHOLISM,
https://www.niaaa.nih.gov/alcohols-effects-health/alcoholpolicy#:~:text=The%20Federal%20Uniform%20Drinking%20Age,State%20abides
%20by%20that%20standard [https://perma.cc/KL5U-QVQV] (last visited on Feb. 14,
2022).
6
See Driving Age by State 2022, WORLD POPULATION REV.,
https://worldpopulationreview.com/state-rankings/driving-age-by-state
[https://perma.cc/3MSV-DR4M] (last visited on Feb. 14, 2022).
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fifteen-year-old, however, who is not considered responsible enough to
buy a ticket to an R-rated movie, may be sentenced to life in prison without
the opportunity for parole (“LWOP”).7 Not only is the United States the
only nation which permits LWOP sentences for fifteen-year-olds,8 but the
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Brett Jones’s case
makes it clear that a sentencing judge does not even need to find that
juveniles like Jones are “irreparably corrupt” or incapable of reform before
imposing the harshest sentence available.9
Part II of this Note outlines the relevant facts and procedural
background of Jones v. Mississippi.10 Part III summarizes the Court’s
relevant Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Part IV details the majority,
concurring, and dissenting opinions in Jones, which fundamentally
disagreed about how to apply juvenile sentencing precedents. Part V first
explores why both the majority and dissent ultimately failed to provide
any clarification on the important question of which juveniles may receive
an LWOP sentence and which juveniles may not. It then analyzes the
consequences of this failure and discusses why a categorical ban is the best
solution to the juvenile LWOP sentencing problem.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Brett Jones was sentenced to die in prison for a crime he committed
when he was fifteen years old.11 Until that point, Jones had been the victim
of neglect and abuse for most of his short life.12 His mother abused
alcohol, suffered from mental health issues, and frequently left Jones and
his brother unattended throughout Jones’s childhood.13 His biological
father physically abused his mother – he knocked out her teeth and broke
her nose multiple times – until the two separated when Jones was young.14
When Jones was around ten years old, he and his younger brother began
to suffer verbal and physical abuse from their stepfather.15 He would grab

7
See, e.g., Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1312–13 (Brett Jones was sentenced to LWOP
when he was fifteen years old.).
8
Josh Rovner, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Overview, SENTENCING
PROJECT (May 24, 2021), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/juvenilelife-without-parole/ [https://perma.cc/5QUX-334U].
9
Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1315–23. LWOP is the most extreme punishment available
to juvenile offenders because the Court banned capital punishment for juvenile
offenders in 2005. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
10
Jones, 141 S. Ct. 1307.
11
Id. at 1338 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
12
Id.
13
Jones v. State, 285 So. 3d 626, 630 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017).
14
Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1338 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
15
Jones, 285 So. 3d at 630.
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them by the neck and toss them around, leaving marks and bruises.16 Jones
was beaten with belts, switches, and paddles, and frequently referred to by
“cruel epithets.”17 According to Jones’s grandmother, Jones was the
subject of much of the abuse because he was “simply ‘easier to hurt and
beat.’”18
Jones began to contemplate harming himself at the age of eleven or
twelve to escape “the panic and the hurt” he felt.19 He experienced
hallucinations and was prescribed antidepressant medications.20 In the
summer after Jones finished eighth grade, his stepfather grabbed him by
the throat after he arrived home late one night.21 When Jones fought back,
the police were called to the house and Jones was arrested.22 Jones was
effectively kicked out of the house, and moved in with his grandparents in
Mississippi.23 After the move, his antidepressant medications were
suddenly cut off.24
When Jones moved, his girlfriend ran away from her home in Florida
to be with him and live at his grandparents’ house in secret.25 On August
9, 2004, Jones’s grandfather discovered that Jones’s girlfriend was living
at the house and forced her to leave.26 Later that same day, Jones and his
grandfather got into an argument in the kitchen.27 His grandfather
cornered him, “got in his face,” and swung at him. 28 Jones testified that
he had a knife in his hand from making a sandwich, and that he “threw the
knife forward,” stabbing his grandfather, because he “[did not] have
anywhere to go between the corner and [his grandfather].”29 His
grandfather momentarily backed up but continued to come after Jones.30
As they continued to fight, Jones ultimately stabbed his grandfather seven
more times.31 His grandfather staggered outside and died on the ground.32

16

Id.
Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1338 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Jones, 285 So. 3d at 630.
22
Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1338 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 1338–39.
27
Jones v. State, 285 So. 3d 626, 628 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017).
28
Id.
29
Id. (quoting Jones’s trial testimony).
30
Id.
31
Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1312; Jones, 285 So. 3d at 628.
32
Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1312.
17
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Jones attempted to save his grandfather with CPR.33 When that
failed, he tried to cover up his actions.34 He pulled his grandfather’s body
into the laundry room, used a hose to clean the blood off of himself, threw
his shirt in the garbage, and moved a car over the carport floor to cover up
blood spots.35 A neighbor saw him outside in a bloody shirt, and Jones
claimed that the blood was a joke.36 When he was arrested later that night,
he agreed to be interviewed by a police officer without invoking his right
to silence or counsel.37
At Jones’s trial, the jury rejected his self-defense argument and found
him guilty of murder.38 He received an LWOP sentence pursuant to a
Mississippi statutory mandate.39 He then moved for post-conviction relief
in state court on the grounds that the mandatory sentence violated the
Eighth Amendment.40 After the state trial court and the Mississippi Court
of Appeals denied the motion, Jones appealed to the Mississippi Supreme
Court.41 During that time, the Supreme Court of the United States held
that mandatory juvenile LWOP sentences were unconstitutional.42 The
Court’s holding required sentencers to “take into account how children are
different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably
sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”43 It identified several factors that
a judge should consider, including a juvenile defendant’s chronological
age and its hallmark features, family and home environment,
incompetence associated with youth, and the circumstances surrounding
the crime.44 In the wake of that decision, the Mississippi Supreme Court
ordered a new sentencing hearing for Jones in which the judge was to take
these factors into account before selecting an appropriate sentence.45
The new sentencing hearing took place roughly ten years after Jones
was originally convicted and sentenced to prison.46 At the hearing, Jones
provided evidence that he was capable of rehabilitation and had “matured
significantly since his crime.”47 Jones, his mother, and his younger brother
all testified about the verbal and physical abuse Jones endured from the
33

Id. at 1339 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id.
35
Jones, 285 So. 3d at 628.
36
Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1339 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
37
Id.
38
Id. at 1312 (majority opinion).
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id. (citing Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)).
43
Miller, 567 U.S. at 480.
44
See id. at 477.
45
Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1312–13.
46
See Jones v. State, 285 So. 3d 626 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017).
47
Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1339 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
34
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ages of ten to fifteen.48 An officer who knew Jones from Jones’s time at a
correctional facility testified that Jones got along with others, stayed out
of trouble, obtained his GED, and became “‘almost like [a] son’” during
that time.49 Jones’s grandmother – the widow of the man he stabbed –
testified that she continued to speak with Jones weekly to provide him
encouragement and “remain[ed] steadfast in her belief that [Jones] is not
and never was irreparably corrupt.”50 Nevertheless, the sentencing judge
determined that LWOP remained the appropriate sentence.51 The
Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, and the Supreme
Court of the United States granted certiorari to address disagreement and
uncertainty about how to interpret its recent juvenile sentencing
holdings.52
Jones argued that the Court’s recent decisions in Miller v. Alabama
and Montgomery v. Louisiana require more than just the discretion to
impose a sentence less than LWOP.53 He raised three arguments to
support his contention that a sentencer was further required to make a
separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility before imposing
LWOP on a juvenile offender.54 First, he claimed that the Constitution
requires such a finding before a juvenile is eligible for LWOP, similar to
some of the Court’s death penalty cases, where the Court recognized that
the factual finding of an intellectual disability or a lack of sanity renders a
defendant ineligible for capital punishment.55 Second, Jones argued that
the Montgomery Court held that Miller was a substantive rule, and thus the
Court must have envisioned more than just a discretionary sentencing
hearing at which factors related to youth are considered.56 Third, he
reasoned that Miller and Montgomery sought to ensure that juvenile
48

Jones, 285 So. 3d at 630.
Id. at 631.
50
Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1339 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (internal quotations
omitted).
51
Id. at 1313 (majority opinion).
52
Id. Some courts applied the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama to
all cases in which a juvenile was sentenced to LWOP, while other courts applied the
ruling to only mandatory juvenile LWOP sentences. 567 U.S. 460 (2012); see Jones,
141 S. Ct. at 1313 (comparing Malvo v. Mathena, 893 F.3d 265 (4th Cir. 2018); with
United States v. Sparks, 941 F.3d 748 (5th Cir. 2019)).
53
Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1313; see Miller, 567 U.S. 460; Montgomery v. Louisiana,
577 U.S. 190 (2016).
54
Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1314–15.
55
Id. at 1315 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (lack of intellectual
disability as a criterion); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (sanity as a
criterion)).
56
Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1316–17. The Miller Court held that mandatory juvenile
LWOP sentences were unconstitutional. Miller, 567 U.S. at 479. The Montgomery
Court held that the Miller holding applied retroactively and thus established that Miller
created a substantive constitutional rule. Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 212.
49
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LWOP sentences were rare, and a specific fact-finding requirement was
necessary to accomplish that objective.57 Jones alternatively argued that if
a sentencer is not required to make a separate permanent incorrigibility
finding, he must at least provide an on-the-record explanation with an
implicit finding of permanent incorrigibility to ensure that a juvenile
offender’s age is considered.58
The Court held that a sentencer is not required to either make a
separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility or provide an on-therecord sentencing explanation with an “implicit finding” of permanent
incorrigibility before imposing a sentence of LWOP on a juvenile
homicide offender.59

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court has consistently referred to “the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” to
determine whether a particular criminal punishment violates the Eighth
Amendment.60 The Court has looked to relevant state legislative actions
and patterns in jury determinations as evidence of these evolving
standards.61 Over the past few decades, the Court has established two
strands of Eighth Amendment precedent:62 (1) cases with substantive
holdings – adopting categorical bans on particular sentences for certain
classes of offenders or crimes,63 and (2) cases with procedural holdings –
prohibiting various mandatory sentencing statutes and requiring
sentencing authorities to follow certain processes.64
The Court recently confronted these two lines of precedent in a trio
of cases related to juvenile LWOP sentencing.65 In the first case – Miller
– the Court analyzed both lines of precedent and held that mandatory

57

Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1318.
Id. at 1319.
59
Id. at 1315–23.
60
See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 58 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 561 (2005); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821 (1988); Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976).
61
See, e.g., Graham, 560 U.S. at 62–67; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313–
19 (2002); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 822–33; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 291–99.
62
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470 (2012) (“The cases before us implicate
two strands of precedent reflecting our concern with proportionate punishment.”).
63
See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 578–79 (creating a categorical prohibition on
juvenile capital punishment).
64
See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608–09 (1978) (requiring
consideration of mitigating factors in death penalty cases).
65
See Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021); Montgomery v. Louisiana,
577 U.S. 190 (2016); Miller, 567 U.S. 460. Sections C and D of this Part will focus
on Miller and Montgomery.
58
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juvenile LWOP sentences were unconstitutional.66 In the second case –
Montgomery – the Court was required to decide whether the Miller Court’s
decision was more like the substantive or procedural line of holdings to
resolve the open question of whether Miller categorically banned LWOP
for a certain class of offenders.67 The third case – Jones – is the subject of
this Note.

A. Substantive Eighth Amendment Rulings
In 2005, the Court in Roper v. Simmons determined that the evolving
standards of decency – especially legislative actions and enforcement
patterns that had emerged over the previous fifteen years – indicated a
national consensus against the practice of executing any juvenile
offender.68 Specifically, only six states had actually executed juvenile
offenders during that period,69 and thirty states had prohibited the juvenile
death penalty altogether by 2005.70 The Court also noted three general
differences between juveniles and adults to demonstrate that juveniles
cannot be considered amongst the “worst offenders” eligible for capital
punishment: (1) a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility are much more common in juveniles, (2) juveniles are much
more susceptible to peer pressure, and (3) the personality traits of juveniles
are much less formed.71 Therefore, the Court categorically banned capital
punishment for all offenders who were under eighteen years old at the time
of their crimes.72
Five years after the Court prohibited the death penalty for juveniles,
it confronted for the first time a categorical challenge to LWOP sentences
for non-homicide offenders under eighteen years old.73 In Graham v.
Florida, the Court determined that actual sentencing practices indicated
that very few juveniles were serving LWOP sentences for non-homicide

66

Miller, 567 U.S. at 470.
Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 206 (A procedural rule “regulates only the manner,”
while a substantive rule “prohibits a certain category of punishment” for certain
defendants.).
68
Roper, 543 U.S. at 564–75. In 1988, the Court held that the death penalty was
unconstitutional when imposed on offenders under the age of sixteen. Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988). But one year later, in Stanford v. Kentucky, the
Court made clear that its holding in Thompson was limited to offenders under sixteen
years old. 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
69
Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.
70
Id. Twelve states had abandoned the death penalty altogether, and eighteen
states maintained it but excluded juveniles from its reach. Id.
71
Id. at 569–70.
72
Id. at 578.
73
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 64 (2010).
67
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offenses.74 By 2010, there were only around 124 such offenders,75 all of
whom were sentenced among just eleven states.76 As for the penological
justifications, the Court noted that there were no legitimate retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation rationales.77 Acknowledging
that LWOP is especially harsh for juveniles because they will serve a much
greater percentage of their lives in prison than adult offenders who receive
the same sentence,78 the Court held that the Constitution prohibits LWOP
sentences for non-homicide juvenile offenders.79

B. Procedural Eighth Amendment Requirements
In two cases in the late 1970s, the Court established that mandatory
death penalty statutes were unconstitutional, and it created a procedural
requirement under the Eighth Amendment – that a sentencer consider
relevant mitigating factors at the sentencing phase before imposing a
sentence of death.80 In Woodson v. North Carolina, the Court determined
that there was a significant societal development towards the rejection of
mandatory death sentences because they failed to allow for particularized
consideration of defendants’ individual characteristics.81 In Lockett v.
Ohio, the Court clarified what the particularized consideration should
entail: “the sentencer… [must] not be precluded from considering, as a
mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any
of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis
for a sentence less than death.”82

74

Id. at 62–64.
Id. at 64.
76
Id. Seventy-seven of the non-homicide juvenile LWOPers were sentenced in
Florida, and the remaining sentences were imposed among a total of only ten states.
Id.
77
Id. at 71 (“A sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its
nature disproportionate to the offense.”).
78
Id. at 70.
79
Id. at 82.
80
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304–05 (1976) (holding that a
statutory mandate of the death penalty for first-degree murder violated the Eighth
Amendment because it did not allow for “consideration of the character and record of
the individual offender”); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978) (holding that
“[t]o meet constitutional requirements, a death penalty statute must not preclude
consideration of relevant mitigating factors”).
81
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (“Consideration of both the offender and the offense
in order to arrive at a just and appropriate sentence has been viewed as a progressive
and humanizing development.”).
82
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604.
75
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C. Miller v. Alabama
An examination of both the substantive and procedural Eighth
Amendment precedents led the Court to conclude that mandatory juvenile
LWOP sentences were unconstitutional.83 According to the Court in
Miller v. Alabama, the cases categorically banning certain juvenile
punishments – specifically, Roper and Graham – established that children
are constitutionally different from adults for sentencing purposes because
of (1) psychological distinctions between juvenile and adult minds, 84 and
(2) diminished penological justifications of LWOP for children.85 The
procedural cases – namely, Woodson and Lockett – represented a shift
toward individualized sentencing in cases involving the most serious
punishments.86 Considered together, these two lines of cases taught that a
mandatory sentencing scheme for juvenile LWOP “poses too great a risk
of disproportionate punishment.”87 It precludes a review of crucial
individualized sentencing factors, such as immaturity, family and home
environment, peer pressures, and incompetency in dealing with
prosecutors.88
While the Miller Court explicitly declined to address the argument
that the Eighth Amendment requires a categorical ban of all juvenile
LWOP sentences,89 it seemed to make conflicting statements about
83

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470 (2012). The petitioners in Miller v.
Alabama were both fourteen years old at the time they committed their respective
crimes, and each was sentenced to LWOP without the sentencing authority having any
discretion to impose a lesser punishment. Id. at 465. One petitioner was convicted of
capital felony murder and aggravated robbery for his participation in the robbery of a
video store. Id. at 465–66. The second petitioner was convicted of murder in the
course of arson. Id. at 468–69.
84
Id. at 471–72. The Court pointed to findings in Roper – that adolescents
develop patterns of problem behavior at a relatively smaller rate – and Graham – that
brain science developments show differences in the parts of the brain involving
behavior control – to support the notion that children have a lessened moral
culpability. Id.
85
Id. at 472–73. The retribution rationale is lacking because a juvenile offender
cannot be as blameworthy as an adult offender. Id. at 472. A deterrence justification
is insufficient because the same characteristics which make juveniles less culpable
also make them less likely to deliberate potential punishments. Id. Incapacitation
could not be used for support because “incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.” Id.
at 472–73 (quotations omitted). Rehabilitation is not a proper justification because
LWOP is at odds with any capacity to change. Id. at 473.
86
Id. at 476 (“[T]hese decisions too show the flaws of imposing mandatory
[LWOP] sentences on juvenile homicide offenders” because mandatory sentences
“preclude a sentencer from taking account of an offender’s age and the wealth of
characteristics attendant to it.”).
87
Id. at 479.
88
Id. at 477–78.
89
Id. at 479.
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whether its holding was more substantive or procedural in nature.90 On
one hand, the Court noted that its decision “[did] not categorically bar a
penalty for a class of offenders,” but rather “mandate[d] only that a
sentencer follow a certain process.”91 If a procedural rule was announced
– as the previous language suggests – a sentencer would be required
merely to consider certain factors before imposing a punishment.92
However, the Court alternatively suggested that juvenile LWOP sentences
would be rare because they would involve the difficult distinction between
“the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient
immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable
corruption.”93 If a distinction between those that are immature and those
that are irreparably corrupt is required, it implies that LWOP is
unconstitutional for a certain class of offenders – those that are not
irreparably corrupt – and thus that the Miller holding is substantive.94

D. Montgomery v. Louisiana
In Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Court addressed the confusion
surrounding the scope of the Miller decision.95 Specifically, the
Montgomery Court faced the question of whether Miller applied
retroactively to juvenile offenders whose sentences were final when Miller
was decided.96 The Constitution requires that state courts give retroactive
effect to Miller if it announced a substantive rule of constitutional law.97
A substantive rule is one which “prohibits ‘a certain category of
punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.’”98
Therefore, Miller established a substantive constitutional rule if it created
a categorical prohibition on LWOP sentences for a certain class of juvenile
offenders.99

90

See id. at 479–80, 483.
Id. at 483.
92
Id. at 503.
93
Id. at 479–80 (quotations omitted).
94
Id. at 482; see also Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 206–12 (2016).
95
Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 206–12.
96
Id. at 194. In 1963, the petitioner in Montgomery was convicted of murder for
the killing of a Louisiana sheriff. Id. He was seventeen years old at the time of the
crime, and he was sentenced to LWOP pursuant to a mandatory Louisiana statute. Id.
97
Id. at 200. To come to this conclusion, the Court cited to Teague v. Lane,
which set forth the framework for retroactivity in federal collateral review cases. Id.
(citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)). The Teague framework “requires the
retroactive application of new substantive and watershed procedural rules in federal
habeas proceedings.” Id. at 198–99. The Court in Montgomery limited its holding to
substantive rules under the Teague framework. Id. at 200.
98
Id. at 206 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989)).
99
Id.
91
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In the Montgomery Court’s analysis of Miller, it acknowledged that
Miller (1) recognized that children are constitutionally different for
sentencing purposes,100 and (2) made clear that a juvenile LWOP sentence
should be reserved for the “rare juvenile offender who exhibits such
irretrievable depravity that rehabilitation is impossible.”101 Thus, the
Court concluded that Miller “did more than require a sentencer to consider
a juvenile’s youth.”102 While the Court noted that “Miller did not impose
a formal factfinding requirement,”103 it also stated that “[e]ven if a court
considers a child’s age before sentencing him or her to [LWOP], that
sentence still violates the Eighth Amendment for a child whose crime
reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity.”104
Based on its
interpretation of Miller, the Court determined that the holding prohibited
LWOP sentences for the class of juvenile offenders whose crimes showed
the immaturity that comes with youth. 105 Therefore, the Court held that
Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional law and must be
applied retroactively.106
Confronted with Miller and Montgomery, the Jones Court had the
opportunity to clarify and add to the Montgomery Court’s language about
the class of juvenile offenders exempt from LWOP sentences.107 It
ultimately chose to take a step back.108

IV. INSTANT DECISION
The ultimate issue in Jones was whether a sentencing judge is
required to make a separate finding that a juvenile is permanently
incorrigible before the judge sentences the juvenile to LWOP. 109 The
answer depends on two important considerations: (1) how to interpret what
is required by the Miller and Montgomery holdings, and (2) where to draw
the line between formal requirements and guided discretion.110 This Part

100

Id. at 206–07.
Id. at 208.
102
Id. (emphasis added).
103
Id. at 211.
104
Id. at 208 (quotations omitted).
105
Id.
106
Id. at 212. The Court recognized Louisiana’s argument that Miller created
merely a procedural rule; but the Court stated that the argument “conflates a
procedural requirement necessary to implement a substantive guarantee with a rule
that regulates only the manner of determining the defendant’s culpability.” Id. at 209–
11 (quotations omitted).
107
Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021).
108
See id. at 1311.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 1311–37.
101
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examines the difference between how the majority, concurrence, and
dissent addressed these questions.

A. Justice Kavanaugh’s Majority Opinion
The majority held that Miller and Montgomery do not impose a
requirement that a sentencing judge either (1) make a separate finding of
permanent incorrigibility,111 or (2) provide an on-the-record explanation
with an implicit finding of permanent incorrigibility.112
The majority first considered the argument that a separate finding of
permanent incorrigibility is required in juvenile LWOP sentencing
procedures.113 It stated that “Miller mandated ‘only that a sentencer follow
a certain process’” and “Montgomery then flatly stated that . . . ‘a finding
of fact regarding a child’s incorrigibility . . . is not required.’”114 Thus, the
majority argued, “Miller and Montgomery squarely rejected such a
requirement.”115
The majority noted that the Miller Court “declined to characterize
permanent incorrigibility as [an] eligibility criterion” because even
psychologists struggled to identify which crimes reflected irreparable
corruption.116 Thus, it contended, the Montgomery Court made clear that
what was required by Miller was just “[a] hearing where youth and its
attendant characteristics are considered as sentencing factors…” as
opposed to a specific finding of incorrigibility.117 The majority
additionally relied on data from Miller to support the conclusion that a
discretionary sentencing system is sufficient to ensure that juvenile LWOP
sentences are relatively rare.118
The majority then considered Jones’s alternative argument that a
sentencer must at least provide an on-the-record explanation to ensure that
the defendant’s youth was considered.119 It ultimately determined that
such an explanation is not required because (1) it would be nearly
impossible for a sentencer to avoid considering a defendant’s youth if the
defense raises that factor, (2) Miller “did not even hint at requiring an on111

Id. at 1313.
Id. at 1319.
113
Id. at 1314.
114
Id. at 1314–15 (quotations omitted).
115
Id. at 1314.
116
Id. at 1315.
117
Id. at 1317.
118
Id. at 1318. The Miller Court noted that only about fifteen percent of all
juvenile LWOP sentences occurred in states which allowed for discretionary
sentencing, while the other eighty-five percent came from the twenty-nine
jurisdictions which had mandatory sentencing guidelines. See Miller v. Alabama, 567
U.S. 460, 483 n.10 (2012).
119
Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1319.
112
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the-record sentencing explanation,” and (3) the Court has never required a
similar explanation in analogous death penalty cases.120

B. Justice Thomas’s Concurrence
While Justice Thomas agreed with the majority that there is no
constitutional requirement of a separate permanent incorrigibility finding
in juvenile LWOP sentencing procedures, he thought the majority read
Montgomery incorrectly in coming to that conclusion.121 Although he
believed that Miller announced a purely procedural rule – that a juvenile
LWOP sentence must involve an individualized sentencing process – he
argued that the rule was expanded when the Montgomery Court applied it
retroactively.122 Thus, Justice Thomas stated that the Montgomery holding
established that “there must be a determination as to whether Jones falls
within [the] protected class” of offenders who are exempt from juvenile
LWOP sentences.123

C. Justice Sotomayor’s Dissent
The dissent argued that the majority’s failure to follow the holdings
in Miller and Montgomery essentially permits a juvenile to be sentenced
to LWOP even if his crime “reflects unfortunate yet transient
immaturity.”124 Justice Sotomayor pointed to the Montgomery Court’s
own language to support her position that Miller and Montgomery required
a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility: “Even if a court
considers a child’s age before sentencing him or her to a lifetime in prison,
that sentence still violates the Eighth Amendment for a child whose crime
reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity.” 125 The dissent raised
several reasons for its fundamental disagreement with the majority’s
holding.126
First, the dissent reiterated that the Court has consistently recognized
that children are constitutionally different from adults for sentencing

120

Id. at 1319–21.
Id. at 1323 (Thomas, J., concurring).
122
Id. at 1324–25 (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)) (explaining that
the Teague doctrine required the Court in Montgomery to “rewrite [Miller] into a
substantive rule” to apply it retroactively); see supra note 97 and accompanying text.
123
Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1326 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas suggested
that the class of offenders subject to the prohibition are those “whose crimes reflect
transient immaturity.” Id. at 1325.
124
Id. at 1328 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
125
Id. at 1328 (quoting Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 208 (2016)).
126
Id. at 1328–37.
121
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purposes.127 Second, it argued that the majority “distort[ed] Miller and
Montgomery beyond recognition.”128 Justice Sotomayor acknowledged
that while Montgomery stated that “Miller did not impose a formal
factfinding requirement,” it also clarified that the lack of a formal
factfinding requirement “does not leave [s]tates free to sentence a child
whose crime reflects transient immaturity to [LWOP].” 129 According to
the dissent, there was clear articulation throughout Montgomery to indicate
the essential holding of Miller – that juvenile LWOP sentences are
reserved for those offenders whose crime reflects irreparable corruption. 130
Third, the dissent stated that the majority ignored half of Miller’s
reasoning by stating that the holding was limited to mandatory LWOP
sentences.131 To the contrary, the dissent argued, Miller relied on two sets
of cases – the Roper/Graham line of juvenile sentencing cases and the
Woodson/Lockett line of analogous death penalty cases – and was clear
that it drew primarily from the juvenile sentencing line, which established
categorical bans on juvenile capital punishment and juvenile LWOP for
non-homicide offenders.132 Thus, the Miller Court’s reliance on Roper and
Graham was evidence that it intended to set a substantive limit on juvenile
LWOP sentences.133 Lastly, the dissent argued that the majority’s holding
could not be reconciled with the Court’s precedents, such as the Teague
doctrine discussed previously – which established that substantive
constitutional rules receive retroactive application.134

127
Id. at 1328. The dissent cited specific language from Roper, Graham, Miller,
and Montgomery which indicates that youth matters in sentencing. Id. (citations
omitted); see Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 213 (Juveniles “must be given the opportunity
to show their crime did not reflect irreparable corruption . . . .”); Miller v. Alabama,
567 U.S. 460, 470–71 (2012) ( “[T]he distinctive attributes of youth diminish the
penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on [juveniles] . . . .”);
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 72 (2010) (“[I]ncorrigibility is inconsistent with
youth.”); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (“[Juveniles] cannot with
reliability be classified among the worst offenders.”).
128
Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1330 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
129
Id. at 1330–31 (internal quotations omitted).
130
Id. The Miller holding “did more than require a sentencer to consider a
juvenile offender’s youth before imposing [LWOP].” Id. An LWOP sentence may
violate the Eighth Amendment “[e]ven if a court considers a child’s age before
sentencing him or her to [LWOP]” if that child’s crimes “reflect transient immaturity.”
Id. Thus, the dissent argued, “the linchpin of the [majority’s] opinion” – the
Montgomery language that “a finding of fact regarding a child’s incorrigibility . . . is
not required” – failed to address the other language throughout Montgomery which
held that Miller was substantive. Id.
131
Id. at 1332.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 1332–33.
134
Id. at 1334–37; see supra note 97 and accompanying text (“The Teague
framework ‘requires the retroactive application of new substantive’ rules.”).
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V. COMMENT
The Court granted certiorari in Brett Jones’s case “[i]n light of
disagreement in state and federal courts about how to interpret Miller and
Montgomery.”135 It failed, however, to provide the necessary clarity, as
four Justices pointed out that even the majority’s application of Miller was
directly inconsistent with the Court’s position in Montgomery.136 Justice
Thomas – who joined the majority’s 6-3 judgment – argued that the
Montgomery Court “could not have been clearer that [the Miller] rule
transcended mere procedure.”137 In fact, Montgomery explicitly stated that
“[Miller] rendered [LWOP] an unconstitutional penalty for a class of
defendants because of their status – that is, juvenile offenders whose
crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth.”138 Thus, the majority
relied on an incorrect interpretation of Montgomery,139 and it transformed
the substantive line drawn by Miller into one “more fanciful than real.”140
While the dissent adopted a more accurate and complete reading of
Miller and Montgomery, its conclusion too leaves clarification to be
desired.141 According to the dissent, a failure to separate juvenile
offenders “who may be sentenced to [LWOP] from those who may not” is
a violation of the Eighth Amendment.142 But, what is the rule to be applied
when making that important separation between classes of juvenile
offenders? If it is “permanent incorrigibility” – as Jones suggested – what
does it look like to be permanently incorrigible at less than eighteen years
old?143 If the requirement is to separate between crimes which reflect
135

Id. at 1313.
See id. at 1323 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[I]n reaching [its] result, the
majority adopts a strained reading of Montgomery . . . .”); id. at 1328 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (“[The majority’s] conclusion would come as a shock to the Courts in
Miller and Montgomery.”).
137
Id. at 1325 (Thomas, J., concurring).
138
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 208 (2016) (quotations omitted).
139
See Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1313–23. The majority circumvented the Teague
doctrine when it concluded that Miller merely required a discretionary sentencing
procedure. Id.; see also id. at 1324–26 (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that under
the Teague approach, the Miller rule must have been substantive; and substantive rules
“include those that prohibit a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants
. . .”).
140
Id. at 1326 (Thomas, J., concurring).
141
Id. at 1332–33 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, Miller
drew on Roper and Graham to “set a substantive limit on [juvenile LWOP],” and
Montgomery explicitly rejected the misinterpretation that Miller mandated “only that
a sentencer follow a certain process.” Id.
142
Id. at 1337.
143
Id. at 1314 (majority opinion) (“According to Jones, the sentencer must also
make a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility before sentencing a
murder under eighteen to [LWOP].” (emphasis added)).
136
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“transient immaturity” and those that reflect “irreparable corruption” – as
the Montgomery Court stated – how should a sentencer approach that
determination?144 With many of these questions left unanswered after
Jones, it is clear that both the majority and dissent failed to fully address
the confusion surrounding Miller and Montgomery.145
The Court’s lack of clarification on these issues fails to confront the
near impossibility of properly considering youth as a mitigating factor,
and it effectively permits racially disproportionate sentencing practices. A
categorical ban of juvenile LWOP is necessary to solve both of these
problems.

A. “Un-guided” Discretion
The Court’s rationale for leaving full discretion to sentencers is that
they “cannot avoid considering the defendant’s youth if [they] have
discretion to consider that mitigating factor.”146 Even if this broad
generalization is true, it still leaves two major problems unsolved. First,
considering a juvenile’s youth is only half the battle; a sentencer must also
understand how it indicates which juveniles should be sentenced to LWOP
and which should not.147 Second, the rationale underestimates the
problems of broad discretion by suggesting that the mere consideration of
youth is all that matters. Too much discretion has led to many other
problems as well; namely, LWOP sentencing trends based on
constitutionally impermissible factors.148

1. The Prediction Predicament
In Graham, the Court warned that even if LWOP sentences are
merited for some juveniles, “it does not follow that courts taking a caseby-case proportionality approach could with sufficient accuracy
distinguish the few incorrigible juvenile offenders from the many that have
the capacity for change.”149 In fact, evidence suggests that a prediction

144
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 209 (2016) (“Miller drew a line
between children whose crimes reflect transient immaturity and those rare children
whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption.”).
145
See Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1313–23, 1328–37 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
146
Id. at 1319–20 (majority opinion).
147
Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 208 (“Miller . . . did more than require a sentencer
to consider a juvenile offender’s youth . . . it rendered [LWOP] an unconstitutional
penalty for . . . juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of
youth.” (emphasis added)).
148
See, e.g., Rovner, supra note 8 (“Racial disparities plague the imposition of
[juvenile LWOP] sentences.”).
149
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 77 (2010).
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about whether a juvenile offender is capable of rehabilitation is almost
impossible.150
This difficulty is exemplified in studies of brain development –
showing that the mental capacity for self-regulation is still being formed
during adolescence –151 and recidivism – indicating that very few juvenile
offenders continue to reoffend as adults.152 Taken together, these two lines
of study suggest that almost all juvenile offenders will self-regulate at a
much higher rate and commit crime at a much lower rate as they age. That
begs the question: how does a sentencer predict which small number of
offenders will continue to commit crimes? While this may explain why
the majority was reluctant to mandate a specific finding of incorrigibility,
the Court has discussed on multiple occasions the importance of
distinguishing between “the juvenile offender whose crime reflects
unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose
crime reflects irreparable corruption.”153 If the Court wants to avoid the
imposition of LWOP sentences on juveniles who are not irreparably
150
See, e.g., Elizabeth Scott, Thomas Grisso, Marsha Levick & Laurence
Steinberg, Juvenile Sentencing Reform in a Constitutional Framework, 88 TEMP. L.
REV. 675, 684 (2016) (“[P]rediction of future violence from adolescent criminal
behavior, even serious criminal behavior, is unreliable and prone to error.”); Kimberly
Larson, Frank DiCataldo & Robert Kinscherff, Miller v. Alabama: Implications for
Forensic Mental Health Assessment at the Intersection of Social Science and the Law,
39 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 319, 336 (2013) [hereinafter Larson,
Implications for Forensic Mental Health] (“[T]here is currently no basis in current
behavioral science nor well-informed professional knowledge that can support any
reliable forensic expert opinion on the relative likelihood of a specific adolescent's
prospects for rehabilitation at a date that may be years to decades in the future.”);
Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1315 (noting that even expert psychologists struggle to
“differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet
transient immaturity” and those “whose crime reflects irreparable corruption”).
151
See, e.g., Alex R. Piquero, Youth Matters: The Meaning of Miller for Theory,
Research, and Policy Regarding Developmental/Life-Course Criminology, 39 NEW.
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 347, 349–50 (2013) [hereinafter Piquero,
Youth Matters] (noting that as individuals move from middle to late adolescence, a
strengthening of self-regulation and change in the way the brain responds to rewards
is consistent with an “eventual precipitous decline in delinquency and crime observed
in very early adulthood”).
152
Id. (explaining that “Offending peaks” occur in the late teenage years
between age fifteen and nineteen, and “[o]nly a very small number of persons continue
to offend into and throughout adulthood”).
153
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 208 (2016) (“Even if a court
considers a child's age before sentencing him or her to a lifetime in prison, that
sentence still violates the Eighth Amendment for a child whose crime reflects
unfortunate yet transient immaturity.” (internal quotations omitted)). The appropriate
occasions for juvenile LWOP will be rare because it requires the difficult distinction
between “the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient
immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects
irreparable corruption.” Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012).
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corrupt, its current approach is insufficient because it is nearly impossible
for judges to make that distinction – especially without any guidance.
Another difficult factor to take into account at the sentencing phase
is an individual juvenile offender’s childhood experiences. A 2012 survey
of juvenile LWOPers showed that, as children, an overwhelming majority
regularly witnessed violence in their homes, and almost half were the
victims of physical abuse.154 Some reported being homeless, and less than
half were still attending school at the time of their offenses.155 While it is
estimated that around twenty-five to thirty-four percent of the general
population experience at least one childhood trauma, that number jumps
to ninety-three percent for children entering the criminal justice system.156
Even the most traumatized juveniles are still much better candidates for
rehabilitation than their adult counterparts, however, so a finding of
incorrigibility is still incredibly difficult and requires much more than
unguided discretion.157
Balancing individual childhood experiences with broad scientific
research highlights the difficulty in determining which juveniles deserve a
lifetime in prison. Judges are ill-equipped to accurately make that
distinction and are “poor at predicting which offenders will return to
crime.”158 A group of former juvenile court judges admitted as much in
154

Ashley Nellis, Ph.D., The Lives of Juvenile Lifers: Findings from a National
Survey, SENTENCING PROJECT, https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/thelives-of-juvenile-lifers-findings-from-a-national-survey/
[https://perma.cc/KDQ6TCL4]. The survey interviewed 1,579 individuals, which was roughly sixty-nine
percent of all individuals serving such sentences at that time. Id. Seventy-nine percent
regularly witnessed violence in their homes, forty-seven percent were physically
abused, and fifty-four percent reported witnessing weekly neighborhood violence as
well. Id. Over three-fourths of the girls surveyed reported histories of sexual abuse
during their adolescence. Id.
155
Id. About one-third reported living in public housing, forty-seven percent
stated they were still in school when they committed their crime, and over eighty
percent of the respondents reported they had either been suspended or expelled from
school at some point. Id. Additionally, forty percent were enrolled in special
education courses at some point during their short academic careers. Id.
156
CAMPAIGN FOR FAIR SENTENCING YOUTH, TIPPING POINT: A MAJORITY OF
STATES ABANDON LIFE-WITHOUT-PAROLE SENTENCES FOR CHILDREN 8 (2018),
https://cfsy.org/wp-content/uploads/Tipping-Point.pdf
[https://perma.cc/85FGF8F7]. Researchers have defined adverse childhood experiences as “emotional abuse,
physical abuse, sexual abuse, emotional neglect, physical neglect, household
substance abuse, household mental illness, parental separation, and having an
incarcerated household member.” Id.
157
Elizabeth Scott, Thomas Grisso, Marsha Levick & Laurence Steinberg, The
Supreme Court and the Transformation of Juvenile Sentencing, MODELS FOR CHANGE,
9 (2015). The heightened neuroplasticity in children’s brains “support the view that
juveniles not only are less culpable than adults, but also are likely to be better
candidates for rehabilitation.” Id.
158
Piquero, Youth Matters, supra note 151, at 356.
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an amicus brief to the Miller Court: “Having spent decades overseeing the
cases of juvenile[s]… [we] strongly believe that the criminal justice
system cannot predict what kind of person a fifteen-year-old juvenile
offender will be when he is 35, or 55, or 75.”159 While this is the precise
reason that the majority avoided requiring judges to make a separate
finding of permanent incorrigibility, 160 if judges cannot be expected to
accurately and appropriately impose a sentence when given a standard,
how are they expected to do so with no standard at all? Neither the Miller
Court nor the Montgomery Court believed that children capable of reform
should be sentenced to LWOP.161 If the current practice of discretion is
resulting in these impermissible sentences, a standard must be put in place
to solve that problem. If it is nearly impossible to find a workable
standard, a more substantive constitutional approach must be taken.

2. Racial Bias in Juvenile LWOP Sentencing
The inaccurate sentencing concern is further magnified due to
evidence that sentencing discretion is being exercised disproportionately
on the basis of race. Not only is there a disparity based on the race of the
offender;162 but an even bigger gap exists based on the race of the victim.163
And, since Miller – which suggested that the “appropriate occasions for
sentencing juveniles to [LWOP] [would] be uncommon” –164 the racial
disparity has worsened.165 From 2012 to 2018, about seventy-two percent
of children sentenced to LWOP were Black.166
A possible explanation for the discrepancy is no less problematic than
the statistics themselves: Black juveniles are viewed as more likely to be

159

Brief for Petitioner at 1, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (No. 109646, 10-9647).
160
See Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1315 (2021) (“[I]t is difficult even
for expert psychologists to differentiate between juveniles that are irreparably corrupt
and those that are not.”).
161
See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
162
Nellis, supra note 154 (of the juvenile lifers surveyed in 2012, sixty percent
were Black and less than twenty-five percent were white).
163
Id. The survey analyzed the FBI data on juvenile homicide arrests in states
that permitted juvenile LWOP from 1976 to 2012. Id. During that time, only twentythree percent of juvenile homicide arrests involved a Black offender and a white
victim, but forty-three percent of all juvenile LWOP sentences during that time period
involved Black offenders and white victims. Id. By contrast, 6.5% of the arrests
involved white offenders and Black victims, but only 3.6% of the juvenile LWOPers
were white offenders who murdered a Black victim. Id.
164
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 483 (2012).
165
See Tipping Point, supra note 156.
166
Id.
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violent or reoffend as adults.167 For instance, observational studies showed
that officers were more likely to attribute crimes committed by Black
youths to character traits rather than external factors; and by contrast,
white youths were more likely to have their crimes attributed to their social
surroundings.168 Black children are additionally much more likely to be
viewed as adults than white children.169 When judges have the discretion
to impose a sentence after merely “considering an offender’s youth and
attendant circumstances,”170 data that suggest Black children are viewed
as more mature and more violent is extremely troubling. Because a
juvenile viewed as older and more likely to reoffend seemingly has a
higher likelihood of being classified as “irreparably corrupt,” these biases
remain dangerous in the context of sentencing practices even with the
addition of a separate factfinding requirement.

3. What is the Alternative?
To reiterate, the Court has consistently stated that juvenile LWOP
sentences are reserved for the “rare juvenile offender[s] whose crime[s]
reflec[t] irreparable corruption.”171 There is plenty of evidence to show,
however, that the risk of imposing a sentence of LWOP on a juvenile
offender who is not permanently incorrigible is too great to justify the
arbitrary discretion upheld in Jones.172 The lack of guidance from the
Court has led to a “you just know it when you see it” approach to juvenile
sentencing, and that approach has led to racially disproportionate

167
See generally John Paul Wilson, Nicholas O. Rule & Kurt Hugenberg, Racial
Bias in Judgments of Physical Size and Formidability: From Size to Threat, 113 J.
PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 59, 60 (2017) (“A long history of psychological
research has found that . . . Black people are subject to automatic negative stereotypes
and prejudice.”). Psychological research shows that Black men are more likely than
white men “to be misremembered as carrying a weapon . . . , to activate concepts
related to crime . . . , [and] to be seen as threatening or aggressive.” Id. See also Jeffrey
Fagan, The Contradictions of Juvenile Crime & Punishment, at 52 (2010) (“[R]acial
disparities in the decision to detain and incarcerate youths are influenced by race and
risk factors . . . .”).
168
Fagan, supra note 167, at 52.
169
See Phillip Atiba Goff et al., The Essence of Innocence: Consequences of
Dehumanizing Black Children, 106 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 526, 541
(2014) (“Black children may be viewed as adults as soon as thirteen, with average age
overestimations of Black children exceeding four and a half years in some cases.”).
170
See Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1314 (2021).
171
See, e.g., Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 208 (2016); Jones, 141 S.
Ct. at 1326 (Thomas, J., concurring).
172
Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1317 (majority opinion) (stating that Miller required
merely a “discretionary sentencing procedure”); see Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48,
70 (2010) (“[LWOP] is an especially harsh punishment for a juvenile.”); see supra
notes 150–60 and accompanying text.
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sentencing practices.173 The solution suggested by the dissent – a separate
finding of permanent incorrigibility – will cause its own problems by
forcing judges to make a near-impossible prediction about whether or not
a child is capable of reform.174 Thus, the only constitutional way to
address this conflict is a categorical prohibition on juvenile LWOP.

B. The Standards of Decency have Evolved
The easiest way to address the difficult problems surrounding
juvenile LWOP sentencing is to do away with it altogether. From Roper
to Montgomery, it seemed the Court was heading toward such a categorical
ban.175 The majority in Jones, however, was not only reluctant to continue
down that path, but it backpedaled off of what was required under Miller
and Montgomery.176 Nevertheless, an examination of current state
legislative actions and sentencing practices shows that a national
consensus has formed in opposition to juvenile LWOP sentences.177 And
an analysis of the penological justifications for such a penalty indicate that
a lifetime in prison is disproportionate for offenders under eighteen years
old at the time of their crimes.178

1. The Objective Indicia of Contemporary Values
Today’s “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society” are evidence that it is time to reassess the
constitutionality of juvenile LWOP.179 In Roper, the Court determined
that the fact that thirty out of fifty states had abandoned juvenile capital
punishment signified that the national consensus had shifted.180 And in
both Roper and Graham, the Court supported its holdings with reference
to sentencing practices that showed only a small number of juvenile

173

Cf. Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1322 (stating that Miller resentencings have decreased
the number of juveniles on LWOP); see supra notes 162–70.
174
See supra Section V.A.1.
175
See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016); Miller v. Alabama, 567
U.S. 460 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551 (2005).
176
Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1317 (“Despite the procedural function of Miller’s rule,
Montgomery held that [it] was substantive . . . but the Montgomery Court
unsurprisingly declined to impose new requirements not already imposed by Miller.”).
177
See Rovner, supra note 8 (“The momentum to protect youth rights in the
criminal legal system is clear.”).
178
See, e.g., Graham, 560 U.S. at 71 (“A sentence lacking any legitimate
penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense.”).
179
See, e.g., Rovner, supra note 8.
180
Roper, 543 U.S. at 564; see supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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executions or non-homicide juvenile LWOP sentences, respectively.181 As
of 2021, twenty-five states plus the District of Columbia have
categorically banned LWOP sentences for juveniles; and seven other
states have limited its application.182 There is a strong “trend toward
abolition” – which “carrie[d] special force” in Roper –183 as all but five of
the states that have banned juvenile LWOP did so over the last ten years.184
Additionally, at the start of 2020, 1,465 people were serving juvenile
LWOP sentences.185 That number is a thirty-eight percent drop from 2016,
and a forty-four percent drop from 2012.186 Of the twenty-five states that
have not categorically prohibited the punishment, nine currently do not
have anyone serving a juvenile LWOP sentence.187
The Jones majority relied on these sentencing trends as evidence that
“Miller and Montgomery have been consequential.”188 It argued that the
statistics prove what Miller predicted to be true: that “a discretionary
sentencing procedure [will] help[] make [juvenile LWOP sentences]
relatively rare.”189 The majority of juvenile LWOP sentencing changes,
however, have come about through the legislative process;190 and a
discretionary system that results in less juvenile LWOP sentencing does
not necessarily result in more accurate juvenile sentencing.191 The current
legislative and sentencing patterns make it clear that society continues to
evolve its view that children are constitutionally different from adults for
the purposes of criminal punishment. Just as it was in 2005 and 2010, 192
society in 2021 is prepared to recognize that sentencing any juvenile
offender to LWOP is disproportionate and unconstitutional.
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2. Unjustified Sentencing
The penological justifications for juvenile LWOP sentences are
completely absent. For support, it is not necessary to look any further than
the Court’s own language.193 In Graham, the Court noted that the
deterrence and rehabilitation rationales are not sufficient for juvenile
LWOP sentences.194 With respect to deterrence, it stated that “juveniles’
lack of maturity... often result[s] in impetuous actions and decisions,” and
thus, “they are less likely to take a possible punishment into consideration
when making decisions.”195 For rehabilitation, “the penalty forswears
altogether [that] ideal” because the defendant is denied “the right to reenter
the community.”196 There is also evidence to suggest that there is a lack
of a rehabilitation-focused atmosphere in prisons for persons serving
LWOP.197 Data from the 2012 survey of juveniles sentenced to LWOP
showed that roughly two-thirds were prevented from participating in
programming either because they will never be released from prison, or
because they were being held in prisons without sufficient
programming.198
Additionally, incapacitation cannot justify juvenile LWOP. This
rationale is important to control recidivism.199 Due to developments in
self-regulation and responses to rewards, however, very few juvenile
offenders continue to reoffend as adults.200 In addition, most juvenile lifers
engage in constructive change during their incarceration when given the
opportunity.201 Of those surveyed in 2012, two-thirds obtained a high
school diploma or GED, many attempted to maintain close ties with loved
ones through various forms of communication, and the number of
disciplinary actions against them declined as the years passed.202
Lastly, the retributive justification is lacking for juvenile LWOP
sentences. While the Court’s analysis in Graham was confined to
juveniles who did not commit homicide,203 the same logic applies to all
juvenile offenders. At the “heart of the retribution rationale” is the
193
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principle that “criminal sentence[s] must be directly related to [] personal
culpability.”204 It is clear that children are less personally culpable than
adults.205 Given that the vast majority of juvenile offenders experienced
some sort of childhood trauma – for many, sexual or physical abuse –206
their crimes, including homicide, may likely be attributed to factors other
than an “irretrievably depraved” character.207 Even where they are not,
however, the dissent pointed out that “Jones and juvenile offenders like
him seek only the possibility of parole, not the certainty of release ….”208
Surely, a sentence that requires a child to spend his life in prison unless he
can demonstrate he has rehabilitated himself cannot be viewed as
insufficient to “right the balance for the wrong to the victim.” 209 The
evolving standards of decency reflect that the majority of Americans share
this belief.210
In the Court’s own language, “[t]o justify [LWOP] on the assumption
that the juvenile offender forever will be a danger to society,” a sentencer
is required “to make a judgment that the juvenile is incorrigible.”211 If a
child is truly – and for the sake of argument, even accurately – considered
permanently incorrigible, however, does that not say more about the
system that is supposed to rehabilitate him than it does about the child
himself? Twelve years ago, the Court asserted that “incorrigibility is
inconsistent with youth.”212 If anything has changed over the last decadeplus, it is certainly that there is more evidence to support that conclusion.
The best solution to the confusion and difficulty surrounding juvenile
LWOP sentencing is to categorically prohibit the punishment for all
juveniles. As the standards of decency continue to evolve, the Court will
have no choice but to continue down the path it was on prior to Jones
toward that destination.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Brett Jones experienced just fifteen years of life outside of prison
before he was arrested and sentenced to life without parole.213 Throughout
the majority of that time, he was abused and neglected by the people in his
life who were supposed to care for him the most.214 If the circumstances
surrounding his crime do not reflect an “unfortunate yet transient
immaturity,” it is difficult to envision circumstances that would.215
Because it is nearly impossible for a sentencing judge to make that
determination, however, it is time for the Court to get rid of life without
parole for juvenile offenders. A criminal justice system that is set up to
punish Brett Jones and other children like him by deeming them
“permanently incorrigible” rather than help them is flawed. In the words
of the Court, “[l]ife in prison without the possibility of parole gives no
chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation
with society, no hope.”216 Like Brett Jones, many juveniles deserve the
opportunity to show that they are not “irreparably corrupt”. As Brett Jones
himself told the court at his resentencing hearing,
I'm not the same person I was when I was 15.... I've become a pretty
decent person in life… all I can do is ask you ... please give me just
one chance to show the world, man, like, I can be somebody. I've done
everything I could over the past ten years to be somebody.... I can't
change what was already done. I can just try to show ... I've become a
grown man.217
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